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Many economists and policy analysts seem to believe that loyalty-
rewarding pricing schemes, like frequent yer programs, tend to re-
inforce rms market power and hence are detrimental to consumer
welfare. The existing academic literature has supported this view to
some extent. In contrast, we argue that these programs are business
stealing devices that enhance competition, in the sense of generating
lower average transaction prices and higher consumer surplus. This
result is robust to alternative specications of the rms commitment
power and demand structures, and is derived in a theoretical model
whose main predictions are compatible with the sparse empirical evi-
dence.
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1 Introduction
Frequent yer programs seem to be more popular than ever. In fact, according to
The Economist (January 8th, 2005, page 14) the total stock of unredeemed frequent-yer
miles is now worth more than all the dollar bills in circulation around the world. The
same article also mentions that unredeemed frequent yer miles are a non-negligible item
in some divorce settlements!
The reader can visit www.webyer.com for more detailed information on the volume
and specic characteristics of some of these programs.
See, for instance, Kobayashi (2005).
In some markets sellers discriminate between rst time and repeat buyers
using a variety of instruments. For instance, manufacturers have been
oﬀering repeat-purchase coupons for a long time. That is, they provide
a coupon along with the product purchased, which consumers can use to
obtain a discount in their next purchase of the same product. Recently,
rms have designed more sophisticated pricing schemes to reward loyalty.
For example, most airlines have set up frequent-yer programs (FFPs) that
oﬀer registered travelers free tickets or free class upgrades after a certain
number of miles have been accumulated. Similar programs are also run by
car rental companies, supermarket chains, hotels, and other retailers.
What are the eﬃciency and distributional eﬀects of these loyalty-rewarding
programs? Do they enhance rmsmark et power? Should competition au-
thorities be concerned about the proliferation of those schemes?
Loyalty programs can perhaps be interpreted as a form of price dis-
crimination analogous to quantity and bundled discounts. In particular,
in the context of vertical relations, it has been recognized that loyalty dis-
counts oﬀered by manufacturers when selling to retailers, which are very
often buyer-specic, may serve the same purpose as other vertical control
practices, such as tying and exclusive dealing, and hence they have been
subject to scrutiny by anti-trust authorities.
However, the analogy with quantity and bundled discounts is, at best,
only part of the story. In all the above examples the time dimension seems
crucial. In particular, these programs involve some commitment capacity
(sellers restrict their future ability to set prices) and they aﬀect the pat-
tern of repeat purchases (current demand depends on past sales). It is
precisely this dynamic aspect which is the main focus of this paper. In
other words, our aim is not to undertake a complete analysis of loyalty
rewards. Instead, we restrict attention to single product markets (exclud-
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Airlines also impose additional restrictions, like blackout dates, that are sometimes
modied along the way.
See, for instance, Sharp and Sharp (1997) and Lal and Bell (2003). The introduction
of a loyalty program by a particular rm tends to increase its market share, although its
eﬀect on protability is less clear.
ing bundled discounts) with inelastic demand (excluding static non-linear
pricing). Moreover, we focus on markets for nal consumption goods, and
hence neglect all the issues associated with vertical relations.
Regarding the dynamic aspect of loyalty programs, it is important to
note that the specic details of the examples given above vary substantially.
In particular, repeat buyers do not always know in advance the actual
transaction price. For instance, in the case of FFPs, frequent travelers may
gain the right to buy a ticket at zero price, but they can also use these
miles to upgrade the ticket, in which case the net price is left undetermined
ex-ante. In the case of repeat-purchase coupons, discounts can take various
forms (proportional, lump-sum, or even more complex), and again there is
no specic commitment to a particular price.
Many economists and policy analysts seem to believe that loyalty pro-
grams are anti-competitive, in the sense that they benet rms and hurt
consumers. Unfortunately, the empirical evidence currently available is
scarce. In the marketing literature one can nd somewhat weak evidence
on the inuence of loyalty programs on the pattern of repeat purchases. In
some cases the evidence refers to industries (for instance, grocery retailing)
where loyalty programs have an important bundling component.
The most important evidence for our purposes comes from the air trans-
port industry. FFPs were rst introduced by major US airlines immedi-
ately after deregulation and they were interpreted as an attempt to isolate
themselves from competition. Very recently, Lederman (2003) reported sig-
nicant eﬀects of FFPs on market shares. In particular, she showed that
enhancements to an airlines FFP, in the form of improved partner earning
and redemption opportunities, are associated with increases in the airlines
market share. Moreover, those eﬀects are larger on routes that depart from
airports at which the airline is more dominant. She interprets these re-
sults as indicating that FFP reinforces rms market power. Our analysis
challenges this interpretation.
From a theoretical point of view, some of these issues have been ap-
proached by Cairns and Galbraith (1990), Banerjee and Summers (1987)
and Caminal and Matutes (1990) (CM, hereafter). Cairns and Galbraith
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More recently, Kim et al. (2001) have also studied a duopoly model where rms
can oﬀer lump-sum discounts. The novelty is that rms can choose the nature of those
discounts (cash versus non-cash). They show that rms may have incentives to oﬀer
ineﬃcient cash rewards (higher unit reward cost for the rm than a free product of the
rm). In either case reward programs weaken price competition.
There is also recent literature on the eﬀect of bundled loyalty discounts. See, for
example, Gans and King (2004) and Greenlee and Reitman (2005). These models are
static.
(1990) showed that, under certain circumstances, FFP-type policies could
be an eﬀective barrier to entry. We believe that this insight is essentially
correct, but this is only one dimension of the problem. The last two pa-
pers focused on symmetric, multiperiod duopoly models and characterized
loyalty-rewarding policies as endogenous switching costs. On the one hand,
because of these policies consumers are partially locked-in, and hence they
may remain loyal even when switching is ex-post eﬃcient. On the other
hand, their eﬀect on consumer welfare is less straightforward. Banerjee
and Summers (1987) did show that lump-sum coupons are likely to be a
collusive device and hence consumers would be better oﬀ if coupons were
forbidden. However, CM argued that the specic form of the loyalty pro-
gram might be crucial. In particular, if rms are able to commit to the
price they will charge to repeat buyers, then competition is enhanced and
prices are reduced. However, in their model lump-sum coupons tend to
relax price competition, a result very much in line with those of Banerjee
and Summers (1987). Hence, the desirability of such programs from the
point of view of consumer welfare seemed to depend on the specic details,
which in practice may be hard to interpret. Moreover, the emphasis on
symmetric duopoly and on restricting the analysis to an arbitrary subset
of commitment devices was probably misleading.
In this paper we try to make progress by introducing several innovations.
Firstly, we extend the standard Hotelling model to allow for a large num-
ber of monopolistically competitive rms. Market structure is particularly
crucial in determining the dynamic eﬀects of loyalty-rewarding schemes. In
oligopoly, a rms commitment to the price for repeat purchases inuences
future prots through two diﬀerent channels: (i) consumer demand (lock-
in eﬀect) and (ii) future prices set by rivals (strategic eﬀect). The size of
the latter eﬀect is maximized in a symmetric duopoly, but it is negligible
if the number of rms is large. In order to understand the relative role of
these two channels, it is helpful to study the limiting case (monopolistic
4
competition) where the strategic eﬀect has been shut down completely.
Our second innovation has to do with the set of commitment devices. We
start by studying rms incentives to commit to prices for repeat purchases.
However, rms may not have access to such a commitment technology; or,
even if they do, they might prefer not to use it, perhaps because they are
uncertain about future demand or costs. In this case, instead of restricting
attention to lump-sum coupons, we allow rms to choose the discounting
rule. It turns out that the equilibrium discounting rule is simple but quite
diﬀerent from lump-sum discounts.
Thirdly, we study the interaction between endogenous and exogenous
switching costs. In particular, we ask whether rms have more or less
incentives to introduce loyalty rewarding schemes whenever consumers are
already partially locked-in for exogenous reasons. In other words, we ask
whether endogenous and exogenous switching costs are complements or
substitutes.
Fourthly, we extend the analysis beyond the two-period framework (where
rms actually compete for a single generation of consumers), and consider
an overlapping generation set up. In this context, it is reasonable to assume
that rms are unable to discriminate between diﬀerent types of newcomers.
In other words, former customers of rival rms and consumers that have
just entered the market must be treated equally.
Finally, we study the role of rms relative sizes, in order to contrast the
predictions of the model with the existing empirical evidence, and discuss
some other issues more informally, such as consumer horizon, partnerships,
and entry.
This paper provides an unambiguous message: loyalty rewarding pricing
schemes are essentially business-stealing devices that enhance competition,
in the sense that average prices are reduced and consumer welfare is in-
creased. The introduction of a loyalty program is a dominant strategy for
each rm (provided these programs involve suﬃciently small administrative
costs) but in equilibrium all rms lose (prisoners dilemma). This result is
robust, in particular, to diﬀerent specications of the rms commitment
power, and to alternative demand structures. Moreover, the predictions of
our theory are compatible with the empirical evidence reported by Leder-
man (2003). As mentioned above, she shows that the introduction (or an
enhancement) of an airlines FFP raises its market share. Such a link is
also present in our model. Lederman goes on and argues that this empir-
ical fact is the result of the FFP enhancing the rms market power. Our
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To the best of our knowledge there is no systematic evidence on the eﬀect of FFPs
on rm protability. Lederman (2003) constructs an index of the average fare charged by
each airline. These indices do not seem to include the zero price tickets used by frequent
yers. She shows that an enhancement of the airlines FFP raises its own average fare,
which is again compatible with the predictions of our model.
With the rst period price consumers purchase a bundle: one unit of the good in
the rst period plus an option to buy another unit of the good in the second period at a
predetermined price.
The reasons behind marginal cost pricing for repeat purchases are analogous to those
in Crémer (1984), which was a model of experience goods. See also Bulkley (1992) for a
similar result in a search model, and Caminal (2004) in cyclical goods model.
theory challenges this interpretation and claims that the use of FFPs may
actually signal ercer competition among airlines. Lederman (2003) also
shows that the positive eﬀect of the rms FFP on its market share is rel-
atively larger for large rms. The predictions of the asymmetric version of
our model are also consistent with these results. Large rms are relatively
protected from the pro-competitive eﬀects of FFP (the reduction in prots
is relatively smaller for larger rms), but nevertheless all rms would prefer
that loyalty rewards were forbidden.
In the next section we present the two-period benchmark model. As
mentioned above the model accommodates a large number of monopolisti-
cally competitive rms in an otherwise standard Hotelling framework. A
key feature of the model is that consumers are uncertain about their future
preferences. If, alternatively, preferences were stable over time, then repeat
buyers would only care about the present value of prices but not about
their time sequence. In contrast, under uncertain preferences, a rm can
raise sales and prots by setting a higher current price and committing to
a lower future price (rewarding consumer loyalty).
Section 3 contains a preliminary discussion of the main eﬀects. In par-
ticular, it studies the optimal strategy of a single rm when rivals are
myopic and play the equilibrium strategy of the one-shot game. It is shown
that the rm which is allowed to discriminate between rst-time and re-
peat buyers has incentives to commit to a price equal to marginal cost
for repeat purchases. The reason is twofold. Firstly, such a pricing rule
maximizes the value of the rm-customer relationship, since consumers go
back to the same supplier every time their reservation price is above the
rms opportunity cost. Secondly, the rm is able to appropriate all the
rents generated by such a commitment through a higher rst period price.
The rms commitment creates a negative externality on other rms (a
6
10
10However, from a social point of view, those commitment strategies distort the ex-post
allocation of consumers and average transportation costs increase. In our model with
inelastic demand total surplus depends exclusively on transportation costs. In a more
general model lower average prices would imply higher total surplus.
business-stealing eﬀect) which will also be present when we let other rms
use the same commitment technology.
In Section 4 we present the equilibria of the two-period model under
alternative strategy sets. In one case (full commitment game) we allow
all rms to commit in the rst period not only to the price for repeat
purchases but also to the second period price for newcomers. This is a
useful benchmark. In the other, more realistic case (partial commitment
game) rms can only commit to the price for repeat purchases, and the
second period price for newcomers is chosen in the second period. We
show that the equilibrium strategies of the rst game are time inconsistent.
Nevertheless, the time inconsistency problem has only a minor impact on
prices and payoﬀs. In both cases, rms choose to commit to marginal cost
pricing for repeat buyers and, as a result, average prices are lower and
consumer welfare is higher than in the case in which rms are unable to
commit to any future price.
Under some circumstances rms may not be able or may not wish to
commit to the price for repeat purchases. In Section 5 we show that com-
mitment to a simple discounting rule (a combination of proportional and
lump-sum discounts) is equivalent to committing to future prices for both
repeat buyers and newcomers. Therefore, as a rst approximation, coupons
are actually equivalent to price commitment. In other words, the focus of
the previous literature on lump-sum coupons was highly misleading, es-
pecially in combination with the strategic commitment eﬀect present in
duopoly models.
In Section 6 we pay attention to the interactions between exogenous
and endogenous switching costs. As discussed in Klemperer (1995), switch-
ing consumers often incur in transaction costs (closing a bank account) or
learning costs (using a diﬀerent software for the rst time). Such switching
costs are independent of rms decisions. If rms can use loyalty-rewarding
pricing schemes then average prices and rm prots decrease with the size of
these exogenous switching costs. The same result occurs when rms cannot
discriminate between repeat buyers and newcomers, although the mecha-
nism is completely diﬀerent. We also show that the presence of exogenous
switching costs reduces rms incentives to introduce articial switching
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costs. That is, when consumers are relatively immobile for exogenous rea-
sons the ability of loyalty rewarding pricing schemes to aﬀect consumer
behavior is reduced.
In Section 7 we embed the benchmark model in an overlapping gener-
ations framework in order to consider the more realistic case where rms
cannot distinguish between consumers that just entered the market and
consumers with a history of purchases from rival rms. More specically,
rms set for each period a price for repeat buyers (those who bought in
the past from the same supplier) and a regular price (for the rest). We
show that there is a stationary equilibrium with features similar to those of
the benchmark model. In particular, average prices are also below the case
in which rms cannot commit to the price of repeat purchases. The main
diﬀerence with the benchmark model is that rms set the price for repeat
buyers above marginal cost (but below the regular price). The reason is
that the regular price is not only the instrument to collect the rents gener-
ated by a reduced price for repeat purchases, but is also the price used to
attract consumers who previously bought from rival rms. Hence, rms are
not able to capture all these rents and hence are not willing to maximize
the value of the long-run customer relationship.
In Section 8 we discuss several extensions, including the existence of
rms with diﬀerent relative sizes. Section 9 concludes.
This is essentially a two-period Hotelling model extended to accommodate
an arbitrary number of rms and, at the limit, it can be interpreted as a
monopolistic competition model.
There are rms (we must think of as a large number) each one
produces a variety of a non-durable good. Both rms and varieties are
indexed by . Firms are located in the extremes of spokes
of length , which start from the same central point. Demand is perfectly
symmetric. There is a continuum of consumers with mass uniformly
distributed over the spokes. Each consumer derives utility from only two
varieties and the probability of all pairs is the same. Thus, the mass of
consumers who have a taste for variety is and have a taste for
varieties and , for all Consumer location represents the relative
valuation of both varieties. In particular, a consumer who has a taste for
8
11
11
[ ]
1
2
∈
  



0
(1 )
= 2 2
1
[0 1]
0
= 0 = 0
= 0 100%
0
i j, x , ith
R tx i R t x
j. R
n n > i
n n
,
c .
p c, c.
c . c
c
c >
At given prices, a consumer may prefer today to travel with a particular airline, given
her destination and available schedules. However, the following week the same consumer
may prefer to y a diﬀerent airline as travel plans change.
varieties and and is located at of the spoke, obtains a utility
equal to from consuming one unit of variety and from
consuming one unit of variety As usual we assume that is suﬃciently
large, so that all the market is served in equilibrium.
If then this is the classic Hotelling model. If rm competes
symmetrically with the other rms. If is very large the model
resembles monopolistic competition, in the sense that each rm: (i) enjoys
some market power, and (ii) is small with respect to the market, even in
the strong sense that if one rm is ejected from the market then no other
rm is signicantly aﬀected.
In practice this model works exactly the same as the standard, two-rm
Hotelling model, although interpretation is diﬀerent. In the current model,
a representative rm is located at one extreme of the interval and the
marketat the other. Consumers with a preference for the variety supplied
by the representative rm are uniformly distributed over the interval, al-
though in each location consumers are heterogeneous with respect to the
name of the alternative brand. At the same time these consumers represent
a very small fraction of the potential customer base of any rival rm. As a
result, the representative rm correctly anticipates that its current actions
have a negligible eﬀect on its rivals market shares and hence they will not
aﬀect their future actions.
An important feature of the model is that consumers are uncertain about
their future preferences. More specically, each consumer derives utility
from the same pair of varieties in both periods, although her location is
randomly and independently chosen in each period. Thus, consumers un-
certainty refers only to their future relative valuations of the two varieties.
Marginal production cost is In this class of models, in equilibrium
the absolute margin, is independent of Hence, typically there is no
loss of generality in normalizing In fact, setting does not make
any diﬀerence in most of this paper. The exception is Section 5, where
we analyze discounts. If we set then a proportional coupon of
would be equivalent to a commitment to marginal cost pricing. However,
if we allow for then a proportional coupon alone is generally not
suﬃcient to achieve the desired outcome.
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Both rms and consumers are risk neutral and neither of them discount
the future. Thus, their total expected payoﬀ at the beginning of the game
is just the sum of the expected payoﬀs in each period.
This model is related to the spokesmo del of Chen and Riordan (2004).
The main diﬀerence is that in their model all consumers have a taste for
all varieties. In particular, a consumer located at of the
spoke pays transportation cost if she purchases from rm and
if she buys from any rm . Hence, rms are not small with respect
to the market, in the sense that an individual rm is able to capture the
entire market by lowering its price suﬃciently. Thus, their model can be
interpreted as a model of non-localized oligopolistic competition, rather
than a model of monopolistic competition.
Let us consider the case and and suppose that only one rm
can discriminate in the second period between old customers (those who
bought from that rm in the rst period) and newcomers (those consumers
who patronized other rms), while the rest cannot tell these two types of
consumers apart. In equilibrium non-discriminating rms will set the price
of the static game in both periods, i.e., if we let subscripts denote time
periods then we have . Let us examine the alternatives of the
rm which is able to price discriminate. In case such a rm does not use its
discriminatory power, then it will nd it optimal to imitate its rivals and
set It will attract a mass of consumers equal to one half in each
period, and hence it will make prots equal to in the rst period, and the
same in the second, i.e., from repeat buyers and from new customers.
Suppose instead that the discriminating rm commits in the rst period
to a pair of prices where is the price charged for the rst period
good, and is the price charged in the second period only to repeat buyers.
In this case we are assuming that the ability to commit is only partial, since
the rm cannot commit to the second period price for newcomers . In fact,
the discriminating rm will also charge a price to new customers in
the second period since the market is fully segmented and the rm will be
on its reaction function. The rms commitment is an option for consumers,
who can always choose to buy from rival rms in the second period. Thus,
is in fact the price of a bundle, one unit of the good in the rst period
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In fact, the optimal rst period price is which is lower than This implies
that the rst period market share is higher than one half, and total prots are equal to
plus the option to repeat trade with the same supplier at a predetermined
price.
We can now ask what is the value of that maximizes the joint payoﬀs
of the discriminating rm and its rst period customers. Clearly, the answer
is , i.e., marginal cost pricing for repeat buyers. In other words, the
optimal price, from the point of view of the coalition of consumers and a
single rm, is the one that induces consumers to revisit the rm if and
only if consumers willingness to pay in the second period is higher than
or equal to the rms opportunity cost. Moreover, the discriminating rm
will in fact be willing to set because it can fully appropriate all
the rents created by a lower price for repeat buyers. More specically, if
the rm does not commit to the price for repeat buyers then a consumer
located at who visits the rm in the rst period will obtain a utility
That is, she expects to pay a price equal to
in both periods, but expected transportation costs in the second period
are Instead, if the rm commits to then the same consumer gets
. That is, in the rst period she pays the price but in
the second period with probability the consumer will buy from the same
supplier (maximum transportation cost is equal to the price diﬀerential)
and pay the committed price and the expected transportation cost
Hence, independently of their current location, consumers willingness
to pay has increased by because of the commitment to marginal cost
pricing for repeat buyers ( Hence, the rst period
demand function of the discriminating rm has experienced an upwards
parallel shift of Thus, if the rm were to serve half of the market (same
market share as in the equilibrium without price discrimination) then
. As a result, prots from customers captured in the rst period would
be equal to (which is higher than the level reached in the absence of
discrimination, and those from newcomers in the second period would
be in the second period (equal to the level reached in the absence of
discrimination). Summarizing, commitment to reduces the average
price paid by repeat buyers ( instead of ), but increases sales (reinforces
consumer loyalty) at the expense of rival rms. As a result, if the rm were
to serve half of the market, prots of the discriminating rm increase by
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(prots increase by because of the commitment to .
See also Bulkley (1992) and Caminal, (2004) for the same result in diﬀerent set-ups.
In fact, the rm would like to sell the option to buy in the second period at a price equal
to marginal cost, separately from the rst period purchase. However, transaction costs
associated to such a marketing strategy could be prohibitive. Ignoring those transaction
costs, the rm would charge a price equal to for the right to purchase at a price equal
to zero in the second period and a price for the rst period purchase. The entire
potential customer base would buy such an option and hence total prots would be
which is above the level reached by selling the option to rst period buyers only, .
The intuition about the incentives to commit to marginal cost pricing for
repeat buyers is identical to that provided by Crémer (1984). In contrast
to Crémers results, the sellers commitment to marginal cost pricing for
repeat buyers does not make any consumer worse oﬀ. The seller enhances
consumer loyalty by oﬀering a sequence of prices, which decreases over time,
that are lower on average (to compensate for higher average transportation
costs). Summarizing, when a single rm commits to the price for repeat
buyers then, on the one hand, consumer surplus increases and, on the other
hand, this creates a negative externality to rival rms (a business stealing
eﬀect).
Most of these intuitions will be present in all the games that will be
analyzed below, where all rms are allowed to price discriminate between
old customers and newcomers. Strategic complementarities will exacerbate
the eﬀects described in this section and as a result consumers will be better
oﬀ than in the absence of price discrimination although overall eﬃciency
will be reduced (higher transportation costs).
At this point it is important to note that marginal cost pricing is part of
the equilibrium strategy only under specic circumstances. Our benchmark
model includes some special assumptions. One of them is that the rst
period price is paid only by a new generation of consumers who have just
entered the market and face a two-period horizon. As a result, all the
rents created by marginal cost pricing in the second period can be fully
appropriated by the rm through the rst period price. This is why the
rm is willing to oﬀer a contract that includes marginal cost pricing in the
second period. In Section 7 we discuss in detail the importance of this
assumption. For now it may be suﬃcient to think of the case in which
a fraction of rst period revenues are taxed away. In this case, the rm
cannot fully appropriate all the rents and as a result will be set above
marginal costs, but below the price charged to newcomers.
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There is a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium of the full
commitment game, which is described in the second column of Table 1.
In this case, since rms set all prices at the beginning of the game, the characteristics
of the equilibrium are independent of the number of rms. In other words, the current
model with monopolistic competition is equivalent to the standard duopoly model.
Let us start with a natural benchmark. Suppose that each rm sets the
three prices simultaneously in the rst period (same notation
as previous section. If we denote the average prices set by rival rms
with bars, then second period market shares among repeat buyers and
newcomers, are given respectively by:
(1)
and
(2)
Finally, the rst period market share, is given by:
(3)
A rms optimization problem consists of choosing in order
to maximize the present value of prots:
(4)
The next proposition summarizes the result (some computational details
are given in Appendix 11.1):
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4.2 The partial commitment game
In the equilibrium under full commitment consumers are better
oﬀ and rms are worse oﬀ than in the absence of commitment.
The rst column of Table 1 shows the equilibrium of the game in which
rms cannot discriminate between repeat buyers and newcomers. In this
case all prices in both periods are equal to , all market shares are equal
to and hence total surplus is maximized (the allocation of consumers is
ex-post eﬃcient). If we compare the rst two columns we note that:
Finally, when rms can discriminate between repeat buyers and new-
comers total surplus is lower because of the higher transportation costs
induced by the endogenously created switching costs.
Thus, the possibility of discriminating between repeat buyers and new-
comers makes the market more competitive with average prices dropping
far below the level prevailing in the equilibrium without discrimination.
Firms oﬀer their rst period customers an eﬃcient contract, in the sense
of maximizing their joint payoﬀs, which includes a price equal to marginal
cost for their repeat purchases in the second period. Such a loyalty reward-
ing scheme heightens the competition for customers in the second period
and induces rms to charge relatively low prices for newcomers. Since rms
make zero prots from repeat purchases but also low prots out of second
period newcomers, their ght for rst period customers is only slightly
more relaxed than in the static game. The other side of the coin is that
consumers valuation of the option included in the rst period purchase is
relatively moderate. All this is reected in rst period prices which are
only slightly above the equilibrium level of the static game.
It is important to note that is above the level that maximizes prof-
its from newcomers in the second period (see below). The reason is that
by committing to a higher the rm makes the oﬀer of their rivals less
attractive, i.e., from equation 3 we have that .
In the real world rms sometimes sign (implicit or explicit) contracts with
their customers, which include the prices prevailing in their future transac-
tions. However, it is more diﬃcult to nd examples in which rms are able
to commit to future prices that apply to new customers.
Let us consider the game in which rms choose in the rst period,
and is selected in the second period after observing and
14
0n1
2
2
2
2
2
2
p
p
p
p
p
<
n
n
n
r
n
dx
dp
Proposition 2
Remark 2
Remark 3
There is a unique subgame perfect and symmetric Nash
equilibrium of the partial commitment game, which is described in the third
column of Table 1.
In the equilibrium of the partial commitment game consumers
are better oﬀ and rms are worse oﬀ than in the absence of commitment.
Both consumers and rms are better oﬀ under partial commit-
ment than under full commitment.
The next result shows that the equilibrium strategies of Proposition 1
are not time consistent (intermediate steps are specied in Appendix 11.2).
The equilibrium of the partial commitment game also features marginal
cost pricing for repeat buyers, since the same logic applies. However, the
equilibrium value of is now lower than that of the full commitment game.
The reason is that is chosen in the second period in order to maximize
prots from second period newcomers. Hence, rms disregard the eﬀect of
on the rst period market share. In this case, since rms obtain higher
prots from newcomers, competition for rst period customers decreases,
which is reected in higher rst period prices. As a result:
Thus, the time inconsistency problem has only a minor eﬀect on the
properties of the equilibrium. Moreover, the payoﬀ of a particular rm
increases with its own commitment capacity but decreases with the com-
mitment capacity of its rivals.
Our model can be easily compared with the duopoly model analyzed in
CM. In fact, the only diﬀerence is that in the current model rms cannot
inuence the future behavior of their rivals. In other words, the strategic
commitment eﬀect is missing. As a result, rms wish to commit to marginal
cost pricing for repeat buyers since this is the best deal it can oﬀer their
customers. On the other hand, in the equilibrium of the duopoly game,
rms commit to a price below marginal cost for repeat buyers. The reason
is that if a duopolist cuts below marginal costs this has a second order
(negative) eﬀect on prots, but it also induces its rival to set a lower in
the second period, which has a rst order (positive) eﬀect on prots, since
.
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There might be many reasons why rms may not be able to commit to a
xed price for repeat buyers. Even if they can they may choose not to do
so, perhaps because of uncertainty about future cost or demand parame-
ters. In fact, in some real world examples we do observe rms committing
to discounts for repeat buyers while leaving the net price undetermined.
In this section we consider the same deterministic benchmark model used
above but with diﬀerent strategy spaces. In particular, we allow rms to
commit to linear discounts for repeat buyers instead of committing to a
predetermined price. Below we also discuss the role of uncertainty.
Suppose that in the rst period rms set where and are
the parameters of the discount function:
(5)
Thus, is a proportional discount and is a xed discount. In the
second period rms set the regular price, .
We show that there exist an equilibrium of this game that coincides
with the symmetric equilibrium of the full commitment game of Section 4.1.
Thus, in our model a linear discount function is a suﬃcient commitment
device. By xing the two parameters of the discount function rms can
actually commit to the two prices, and
More specically, in the second period rms choose in order to max-
imize second period prots:
where is given by equation 5. The rst order condition characterizes
the optimal price:
If other rms set the prices given by Proposition , and then it
is easy to check that it is optimal to set those same prices provided
and Thus, using such a pair of a rm can implement
the desired pair of second period prices. Consequently, given that other
rms are playing the prices given by Proposition , the best response for
an individual rm consists of using such a linear discount function and the
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There exist an equilibrium of the linear discount game that
coincides with the equilibrium of the full commitment game.
value of given also in Proposition , which results in The next
proposition summarizes this discussion.
Hence, in our deterministic model there is no diﬀerence between price
commitment and coupon commitment, at least as long as rms can use
a combination of proportional and lump-sum coupons. This equivalence
result suggests that the emphasis of the existing literature on lump-sum
coupons was probably misleading. However, two remarks are in order.
First, in practice it may not be so easy to use a combination of proportional
and xed coupons, as some consumers may be confused about the actual
discounting rule. Second, rms may be uncertain about future demand
and/or cost conditions. Let us discuss these two issues in turn.
In the absence of uncertainty and if rms feel that they should use
one type of coupons exclusively then they will attempt to use the type
that performs better as a commitment device, which depends on parame-
ter values. For instance, if is approximately equal to then proportional
discounts alone will approximately implement the payoﬀs of the full com-
mitment game (the optimal value of is approximately zero). Actually, in
a broad set of parameters, proportional discounts are better than lump-sum
discounts at approximating full commitment strategies. We illustrate this
point in Appendix 11.3.
In the duopoly model of CM rms prefer committing to than com-
mitting to a lump-sum discount. Our point here is that if commitment to
is not feasible or desirable then rms are likely to prefer proportional
discounts to lump-sum discounts.
In order to compare the role of lump-sum coupons under oligopoly and
monopolistic competition, in Appendix 11.4 we compute the symmetric
equilibrium of the game with lump-sum coupons, i.e. rms set in
the rst period and in the second. In this case we have that .
It turns out that in equilibrium , rm prots are below the equilibrium
level of the static game, but above the level obtained in the equilibrium of
the partial commitment game. The ranking of these three games in terms
of consumers surplus is the reverse. In other words, rms are better oﬀ if
they are restricted to use lump-sum coupons instead of being allowed to
commit to the price for repeat purchases. Nevertheless, the use of lump-
sum coupons makes the market more competitive than in cases where no
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In the Appendix we discuss the intuition behind the diﬀerence between the duopoly
and the monopolistic competition cases in more detail.
commitment device is available. The reason is that lump-sum coupons are a
poor commitment device and hence the business stealing eﬀect is moderate
but present. Under duopoly (CM) rms are better oﬀ using lump-sum
coupons than in the absence of any commitment device, just because of
the strategic commitment eﬀect; that is, coupons imply a commitment to
set a high regular price in the future which induces the rival rm to set a
higher future price. It is this Stackelberg leader eﬀect that made coupons
a collusive device in CM.
If rms are uncertain about future market conditions then they face
the usual trade-oﬀ between commitment and exibility. Suppose rst, that
rms are uncertain about future marginal costs. In this case the ex-ante
optimal, full contingent pricing rule involves both and exhibiting
the same sensitivity with respect to the realization of the marginal cost
variable. Thus, in terms of the optimal discounting rule, exibility calls for
a zero proportional discount. In fact, if uncertainty is so great that it is
the dominant eﬀect then the optimal discounting rule probably involves a
small Let us now consider the case of rm-specic demand shocks. For
instance, suppose that in the second period a new generation of consumers
enter the market and their distribution over diﬀerent brands is random.
In this case, the ex-ante optimal, full contingent pricing rule involves a
xed and a variable . Thus, in terms of the optimal discounting rule,
exibility calls for a large proportional discount in order to disentangle
from changes in
Summarizing, uncertainty about future market conditions clearly breaks
the equivalence between price and coupon commitment. However, its im-
pact on the equilibrium discounting rule is diﬃcult to ascertain and prob-
ably depends on the dominant source of uncertainty. Perhaps, we could
explain the prevalence of lump-sum discounts in some real world markets
on the basis of the relative strength of cost uncertainty. In this case, the
commitment power of the discounting rule would be rather limited but
nevertheless the use of lump-sum coupons would be a signal of ercer com-
petition among rms, at least as long as the number of rms is not too
small and the strategic commitment eﬀect is not suﬃciently strong.
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The unique subgame perfect and symmetric Nash equilib-
rium of the partial commitment game with exogenous switching costs in-
cludes As a result,
Total prots per rm are and
consumer surplus per rm is
Suppose that consumers incur an exogenous cost if they switch suppliers
in the second period. Let us assume that is suﬃciently small for optimal
strategies to be given by interior solutions If rms can use loyalty rewarding
pricing schemes, what is the eﬀect of exogenous switching costs on market
performance? Does such a natural segmentation of the market increase or
decrease rmsincen tives to introduce articial switching costs?
Let us introduce exogenous switching costs in the partial commitment
game of Section 4.2. That is, rms choose in the rst period, and
in the second period after observing and The only diﬀerence is
that now, those consumers that switch suppliers in the second period pay
Therefore, second period market shares become:
Similarly, rst period market shares are implicitly given by:
Hence, exogenous switching costs do not aﬀect the price for repeat buy-
ers but they reduce and Therefore, they reduce average prices and
19
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This result holds under both monopolistic competition and duopoly (Klemperer,
1987).
rm prots. The intuition goes as follows. For the same reasons as in Sec-
tion 4, rms have incentives to commit to marginal cost pricing for repeat
buyers. However, because of the exogenous switching costs, in the sec-
ond period rms nd it more diﬃcult to attract consumers who previously
bought from rival rms. As a result, they choose to set a lower second pe-
riod regular price and the fraction of switching consumers decreases. Since
second period prots from newcomers are reduced, rms are more willing
to ght for consumers in the rst period and hence nd it optimal to set a
lower rst period price. Thus, even though consumers are partially locked-
in for exogenous reasons and hence the market is even more segmented,
prots fall.
Note, however, that in the absence of price discrimination, since all con-
sumers change location, protability also decreases with switching costs.
However, the mechanism is quite diﬀerent. In the absence of price discrim-
ination, switching costs aﬀect prices through two alternative channels. On
the one hand, in the second period a rm with a higher rst period market
share nds it protable to set a higher price in order to exploit its relatively
immobile customer base. As a result, rst period demand will be more in-
elastic, since consumers expect that a higher market share translates into a
higher second period market price and hence are less responsive to a price
cut. This eﬀect pushes rst period prices upwards. On the other hand,
rms make more prots in the second period out of their customer base, so
incentives to increase the rst period market share are higher. This eﬀect
pushes prices downwards. It turns out that the second eﬀect dominates.
Therefore, the presence of price commitment aﬀects the impact of exoge-
nous switching costs. If rms commit to the second period price for repeat
buyers, then this is equivalent to a commitment not to exploit locked-in
consumers. Hence, the price sensitivity of rst period consumers is unaf-
fected. Nevertheless, rmsincen tives to ght for rst period market share
increase in both cases, which turns out to be the main driving force.
Let us now turn to the question of how exogenous switching costs af-
fect the incentives to introduce loyalty rewarding pricing schemes. Suppose
that committing to the price of repeat purchases involves a xed transac-
tion cost. For instance, these are the costs airlines incur in running their
frequent ier programs (advertising, recording individual purchases, etc.).
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7 An overlapping generations framework
See also To (1996) and Villas-Boas (2004).
The question is how the maximum transaction cost rms are willing to pay
is aﬀected by .
The main intuition can already be obtained by considering the case
of large switching costs. If is suﬃciently large then consumers will never
switch in the second period, i.e., , In this case, it is redundant
to introduce endogenous switching costs, since they do not aﬀect consumer
allocation in the second period, which implies that consumers and rms
only care about and not about the time sequence. Hence, in this
extreme case, it is clear that the presence of exogenous switching costs
leaves no room for loyalty rewarding pricing schemes.
For low values of the comparative static result provides a similar in-
sight. As increases, consumers switch less frequently and hence the eﬀec-
tiveness of price commitment to induce consumer loyalty is reduced. More
precisely, if no other rm commits to the net gain from committing to
decreases with Similarly, if all other rms commit to the
net loss from not committing also decreases with (See Appendix 11.5 for
details). In other words, exogenous and endogenous switching costs are
imperfect substitutes.
In many situations rms may nd it diﬃcult to distinguish between con-
sumers who have just entered the market and consumers who have previ-
ously bought from rival rms. In order to understand how important this
assumption was in the analysis of the benchmark model we extend it to an
innite horizon framework with overlapping generations of consumers, in
the spirit of Klemperer and Beggs (1992).
Time is also a discrete variable, but now there is an innite number of
periods, indexed by Demand comes from overlapping gener-
ations of the same size. Each generation is composed of consumers who
live for two periods and have the same preference structure as the one de-
scribed in Section Thus, besides the greater number of periods, the main
diﬀerence with respect to the benchmark model is that in this section we
assume that rms are unable to discriminate between rst period (young)
consumers and second period (old) consumers that previously patronized
rival rms. Firms set two prices for each period: the price they charge
21
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At the end of this section we discuss the consequences of relaxing such a restriction on
the set of strategies and allowing rms to oﬀer a menu of contracts to induce newcomers
to self-select.
to all consumers who buy from the rm for the rst time , and , they
price they charge to repeat buyers.
Thus, prots in period are given by:
where as in previous sections, stand for the rms period
market share with young consumers, old consumers loyal to the rm, and
new customers of the old generation, respectively, which are given by:
(6)
(7)
(8)
These equations are analogous to equations 3, 1, and 2, respectively.
The rms payoﬀ function in period is:
(9)
where is the discount factor. We will focus later on the limiting
case of
Let us rst deal with the full commitment case. Thus, given the sequence
of current and future prices set by the rivals, , the price for repeat
buyers set in the past, and the past market share with young consumers,
an individual rm chooses in order to maximize 9. We
focus on the stationary symmetric equilibria, for the limiting case of
The result is summarized below (See Appendix 11.6 for details):
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In the unique stationary symmetric equilibrium
Thus, the avor of the results is very similar to the one provided by the
benchmark model. Firms have incentives to discriminate between repeat
buyers and newcomers, which creates articial switching costs, and never-
theless consumers are better oﬀ than in the absence of such discrimination.
The reason is that treating repeat buyers better than newcomers only has
a business stealing eﬀect and as a result the market becomes more compet-
itive, in the sense that average prices are lower than in the absence of such
discrimination (i.e., in the equilibrium of the static game).
The main diﬀerence with respect to the benchmark model is that in
the current set up is set above marginal cost. In the two-period model
was the only instrument used by the rm to collect the rents created
by setting a lower price to repeat buyers in the second period. Since an
individual rm could fully appropriate all these rents, it was also willing
to commit to marginal cost pricing in the second period, which maximizes
the joint surplus of the rm and its customers. In the current framework,
the regular price is not only paid by young consumers but also by old
newcomers. Thus, if increases in order to capture the rents created by
a lower then the rm loses old newcomers. As a result, the rm does
not nd it protable to maximize the joint surplus of the rm and young
consumers and set the price for repeat purchases equal to marginal cost.
Nevertheless, such a price is still lower than the regular price.
In this section we have dealt so far with the case of unlimited commit-
ment capacity. It would probably be more realistic to grant rms more
limited commitment power. Firms can sometimes sign long-run contracts
with current customers, but it is much more unlikely that they can commit
to future prices for newcomers. Thus, alternatively, we could have assumed
that in period rms can set their regular price, , and the price to be
charged to repeat buyers in the next period, . We conjecture that the
Markov equilibria of such partial commitment game diﬀers from that of
the full commitment game. The reason is twofold. First, under partial
commitment rms set after has already been determined. This is
analogous to the game of Section 4.2. Thus, rms do not take into account
that a higher makes the oﬀers of their rivals less attractive and hence
raises Therefore, under partial commitment regular prices will tend to
be lower. Second, under partial commitment demand by young consumers
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becomes more elastic. A lower implies a larger which implies that the
rms incentives to attract in period old consumers that are currently
trading with its rivals are reduced. As a result, will be expected to be
higher, which in turn increases further. Therefore, the higher elasticity
of demand induces rms to set lower regular prices. Hence, both eﬀect push
regular prices downwards.
On the other hand, lower regular prices imply that rms are less able to
capture the rents associated to reduced prices for repeat buyers, which will
tend to raise the price for repeat purchases. That is, we conjecture that,
under partial commitment, the stationary symmetric equilibrium will be
characterized by a lower and a higher than under full commitment. As
occurred in Section 4, restricting rms ability to commit to future prices
for newcomers has a quantitative eﬀect on equilibrium prices, but the main
qualitative features of equilibrium are independent of it.
In this section rms are restricted to a common price for young and
old newcomers. Alternatively, rms could oﬀer a menu of contracts and let
these two types of consumers separate themselves. The contract targeted to
old newcomers could simply oﬀer a single price for the current transaction,
. The contract targeted to the young could include a price for the current
transaction, , and a price for the next period if the customer remains
loyal, In a separating equilibrium prices must satisfy two incentive
compatibility constraints, which implies that neither type has incentives to
imitate the other type. If neither of these two constraints is binding then
rms face fully segmented markets and hence equilibrium prices must be
those of Section 4.2. In other words, in this case the overlapping generations
structure would be redundant. It turns out that if a stationary equilibrium
exists then it is separating. It is immediate that rms have incentives to
set a lower price for old newcomers (who in turn have access to reduced
prices if they remain loyal to their previous suppliers). Moreover, in such
an equilibrium one of the incentive compatibility constraints is binding.
Hence, allowing rms to oﬀer newcomers a menu of contracts does have
an eﬀect on equilibrium prices, although we conjecture that the qualitative
properties are the same as in the game where rms are restricted to setting
a common price for all newcomers.
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8 Discussion
8.1 Consumer horizon
8.2 Heterogenous patterns of repeat purchases
Fernandes (2001) studies a model where consumers live for three periods. Unfortu-
nately, he restricts attention to a particular kind of reward. In particular, consumers
obtain a lump-sum coupon with the rst purchase, which must be used in the next pur-
chase with the same supplier. In this extreme example, consumers lock-in eﬀects are
minimized.
In this section we discuss the role of various assumptions and consider
diﬀerent extensions.
If we let consumers live for more than two periods, then consumers might be
able to accumulate claims to diﬀerent loyalty programs (might join more
than one FFP). This could reduce the potential lock-in eﬀect of loyalty
programs. However, if rewards are properly designed (that is, if rewards
are a convex function of the number of purchases), then these programs
would still involve signicant switching costs for consumers and the same
qualitative eﬀects should be obtained.
Let us consider the two-period game of Section 4.1 with the following vari-
ation. There are two types of consumers: frequent yers, who purchase
in both periods, and occasional yers, who only purchase in one period.
In order to maintain total demand constant we could let rst period occa-
sional yers be replaced in the second period by a diﬀerent generation of
the same size. First, if rms cannot discriminate between these two types
of consumers then will be higher than in Proposition 1. As a result,
prots in the second period from newcomers who are frequent yers will
be lower, and hence competition for frequent yers in the rst period will
be relaxed. Nevertheless, in the rst period frequent yers will be sensitive
to the commitment to a lower price for repeat purchases and hence their
willingness to pay will be higher than that of occasional travelers. Hence,
rms may be able to discriminate between these two types of consumers by
oﬀering a menu of contracts, as discussed at the end of the previous section.
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8.3 Entry
8.4 Partnerships
See Cairns and Gailbraith (1990).
See Lederman (2003), Section VI.
In this paper we have characterized loyalty programs as a business-stealing
device provided there is suﬃcient competition (the market is fully served).
However, in markets where there is room for entry, incumbents may use
loyalty programs as a barrier to entry. The existence of a large share of
consumers with claims to the incumbents loyalty program may be suﬃcient
to discourage potential entrants.
Recently airlines have formed FFP partnerships. On the one hand, those
partnership enhance the FFP program of each partner by expanding earning
and redemption opportunities. On the other hand, they may aﬀect the
degree of rivalry. Those observers that interpret FFP as enhancing rms
market power have a hard time understanding the formation of partnerships
of domestic airlines who compete head to head on the same routes. In
their view those partnerships appear to increase airline substitutability and
hence they are likely to reduce prots In contrast, we claim that FFP are
business-stealing devices. Hence, partnership between directly competing
rms may relax competition by colluding on less generous loyalty rewards.
A rigorous analysis of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper, but
some intuition can be provided. Consider the duopoly model analyzed
in CM. In the non-cooperative equilibrium rms oﬀer loyalty-rewarding
policies (commit to a lower price for repeat buyers) and as a result industry
prots are lower. Hence, rms would like to collude and agree to cancel
these programs even if they choose regular prices non-cooperatively. This
type of collusion can be implemented by forming a partnership and setting
a common and negligible reward system (setting ) that would
apply to all customers independently of which rm they patronized in the
rst period. In this case, the reward system does not aﬀect the allocation
of consumers in the rst period, and in equilibrium rst period prices are
equal to (the one-period equilibrium price). In an oligopoly with more
than two rms the eﬀect of a partnership would be less drastic, but still
each pair of rms would like to commit not to steal consumers from each
other through loyalty programs, although they still wish to lure consumers
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8.5 Relative sizes
Redemption oportunities of an airlines FFP increases with its size: number of desti-
nations, frequency of ights, etc.
from their rivals. As a result, we conjecture that direct rivals still have
incentives to form partnerships, and they result in less generous loyalty
rewards and higher industry prots.
In order to study the eﬀect of rm size we need to go back to an oligopoly
model. Let us consider the duopoly model of CM with an asymmetric
distribution of consumers. In particular, there are two rms located at
the extreme points of the Hotelling line. A proportion of consumers
are located at and a proportion are uniformly distributed over
Thus, the rm located at is the large rm. Consumer location is
independent across periods. Therefore, the large rms commitment to
is more valuable to any consumer than the small rms commitment to the
same because they anticipate that repeating a purchase at the large rm
is more likely than at the small rm.
Unfortunately, an analytical solution of this asymmetric game is not
feasible and we need to turn to numerical simulations. We have focused on
the case that is suﬃciently small, so that in equilibrium the small rm
is able to attract a positive mass of newcomers (competition is eﬀective)
in the second period. For simplicity, we have also restricted to the full
commitment game: rms can commit in the rst period to the price for
repeat purchases as well as to the price for second period newcomers (no
strategic commitment eﬀect). We have checked (See Appendix 11.7) that
both rms loose with the introduction of loyalty programs, but the large
rm looses relatively less, because its market share increases as consumers
attach a higher value to the large rms program.
Thus, the empirical evidence reported by Lederman (2003) indicating
that the impact of an airlines FFP on its market share is relatively more
important for large rms is perfectly compatible with our model. However,
it is not obvious that such a fact implies that FFPs enhance airlines market
power. In fact our model proposes the opposite interpretation. In our view,
large airlines are relatively protected from the pro-competitive eﬀects of
FFP, but all airlines loose in absolute terms with the introduction of FFPs.
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The rst order conditions of the rms optimization problem are given by:
where and and are given by
equations 1-3 in the text. In a symmetric equilibrium we have that
Plugging these conditions into the rst order conditions and
solving the system we obtain the strategies stated in the proposition.
If we denote the elements of the Hessian matrix by then evaluated at
the rst order conditions we have that
Hence, the matrix is negative semidenite and
second order conditions are satised.
In the second period the rm chooses in order to maximize second period
prots, which implies that:
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1 2
1
1
2
1 2
2 1 2
11
1
12
3
4 22
13
16
2 2
2
3
1
1
2
2
2 2 2 2 2
2
2 2
2
2 2
2
2 2
2 2
( )
=
2
= 0
=
2
( )
2
= 0
= = =
= = +
=
=
1
2
( ) + ( )
=
+ +
2
=
+
2
= 0
= 0
=
2
3
+
2
=
2
3
+ +
2
p , p
d
dp
x
M
t
d
dp
x x
x M
t
x p c
t
H , H , H .
p c p c .
x
f. p
 p f c x p c x
x
t p p f
t
x
t p p
t
f x
f . f
p p f
t
c
f
p p
t
c
f
After plugging this expression into equation 3, the rm chooses
in order to maximize 4. The rst order conditions are:
Evaluating these conditions at a symmetric equilibrium and solving, we
obtain the strategies stated in the proposition.
The elements of the Hessian matrix evaluated at the rst order condi-
tions are Hence, second order conditions
are satised.
Suppose that other rms have set and Then the best
response in the rst period is to set exactly these prices. Instead, consider a
rm that arrives at the second period with and a lump-sum coupon
Then such a rm would choose in order to maximize:
where
If is large, then the solution includes and the outcome is
dominated from the ex-ante point of view by If is not too large
the solution is interior and the ex-post optimal prices will be given by:
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11.4 Equilibrium with lump-sum coupons
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Thus, as increases gets closer to the optimal ex-ante response, but
is driven further away from its ex-ante optimal value. Therefore, there
is no value of that allows the rm to commit to a pair of prices close to
the best response.
For arbitrary prices and market shares the second period optimization prob-
lem provides the following rst order condition:
In the rst period, rms choose in order to maximize rst period
prots. The rst order conditions are:
where If we evaluate these
conditions at the symmetric allocation, then we have that
Thus, prots are and consumer surplus per rm is
If we compare the equilibrium under monopolistic competition and duopoly
(CM) then we observe that both coupons and second period prices are the
same in both games, but the rst period under duopoly is
which is far above the rst period price of the monopolistic competition
equilibrium. The intuition is the following. Under duopoly the elasticity of
the rst period demand with respect to the rst period price is higher than
under monopolistic competition. The reason is that a higher rst period
market share (because of a lower rst period price) induces the rival rm
to set a lower second period price, since it has more incentives to attract
new customers. Such a lower expected second period price makes the rst
period oﬀer of the rival rm more attractive, which in turn reduces the
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11.5 Substitutability between endogenous and exoge-
nous switching costs
increase in rst period market share. As a result, such a reduction in the
price elasticity of demand induces rms to set a higher rst period price.
Strategic commitment has two separate eﬀects of diﬀerent signs on the
level of coupons, and it turns out that they cancel each other. On the
one hand, a higher coupon induces the rival rm to set a lower second
period price, which has a negative eﬀect on second period prots. Hence,
duopolists would tend to set lower coupons. On the other hand, a higher
coupon involves a commitment to set lower prices for repeat buyers, which
increases rst period demand. If the rst period price is higher then the
increase in rst period prots brought about by a higher coupon is height-
ened. Hence, through this alternative channel, duopolistic rms would tend
to set higher coupons. In our model both eﬀects cancel each other out and
coupons are the same under both duopoly and monopolistic competition
and therefore, second period prices are also the same.
Suppose that only one rm can commit to Then, analogously to Klem-
perer (1987), non-discriminating rms set:
and make prots:
(10)
The discriminating rm will optimally set:
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As a result prots will be:
(11)
The net benet from committing (the diﬀerence between 11 and 10)
decreases with (provided is not too large).
Suppose now that all rms commit and set the equilibrium strategies of
Proposition If one rm does not commit then it will optimally set:
As a result prots will be:
(12)
The net loss from not committing (the diﬀerence between prots ob-
tained in the equilibrium of Proposition 4 and 12) decreases with
The rst order conditions with respect to and are respectively:
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From equations 6 to 8:
If we evaluate these rst order conditions at a symmetric and stationary
equilibrium ( with , then we get:
(13)
(14)
where
If the value of that satises equation 13 is in the interval
Also, increases with for all On the other hand,
the equation implicitly characterized by equation 14 goes through the points
and and is decreasing in this interval.
Therefore, there is a solution of the system in this interval, which proves
the proposition.
Two rms are located at the opposite extremes of the interval. A pro-
portion of consumers are located at 0 and a proportion are uniformly
distributed over the interval . The rest is exactly as in the benchmark
model, including the fact that the location of individual consumers across
periods is independent.
The following notation corresponds to the rm located at 0:
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- rst period price
- second period price for repeat buyers
- second period price for newcomers
- location of the indiﬀerent consumer in the rst period
- location of the indiﬀerent consumer in the second period among
those who patronized the large rm in the rst period
- location of the indiﬀerent consumer in the second period among
those who patronized the small rm in the rst period
- rst period market share
- second period market share among rst period
customers
- second period market share among non-customers
We denote with bars the variables set by the rival rm (the one located
in 1).
Suppose that rms have no commitment capacity. Since there is no in-
tertemporal link, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of this game con-
sists of repeating the equilibrium strategies of the static game. Hence, in
this section we do not need time subscripts. The indiﬀerent consumer is
located at:
Prots of the two rms in each period are, respectively:
The equilibrium prices, market share and total prots are given by:
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Now, suppose that rms have full commitment capacity; they can com-
mit to both the price for repeat buyers and the price for newcomers. The
expression of the second period indiﬀerent consumers are given by, respec-
tively:
The rst period indiﬀerent consumer, , is determined by the following
equation:
Total prots of each rm are as follows:
First order conditions cannot be solved analytically. Therefore, we have
run a set of simulations. Note that some parameters are qualitatively ir-
relevant in both the static and the full commitment game. First, absolute
margins are independent of and hence prots and market shares are in-
dependent of Thus, there is no loss of generality on setting Second,
it is easy to show that prots and absolute margins are proportional to
and market shares are independent of Hence, for our purposes we can
normalize
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11.7.3 Simulations
The next table reports the results of the numerical simulations for diﬀerent
values of parameter We have chosen values of that are suﬃciently
small so that all solutions are interior (all market shares are positive). The
main conclusions are the following. Firstly, the large rm (the one located
in 0) loses relatively less with the introduction of commitment. In fact,
the higher , the higher the diﬀerence between the relative losses of the
two rms. Secondly, the rst period market share of the large rm also
increases with the presence of commitment. Finally, as expected, in all the
simulations we obtain that (marginal cost pricing for repeat buyers).
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= 0 02
= 0 04
= 0 06
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Static 1.034 1.006 1.027 1.027 1.013 1.013 0.503
Commitment 0.638 0.609 1.148 0.696 1.119 0.664 0.505 0.835 0.168
Relative loss (%) 38.3 39.5
Static 1.070 1.014 1.056 1.056 1.028 1.028 0.507
Commitment 0.666 0.607 1.187 0.727 1.128 0.662 0.510 0.838 0.170
Relative loss (%) 37.7 40.1
Static 1.107 1.022 1.085 1.085 1.043 1.043 0.510
Commitment 0.696 0.606 1.228 0.759 1.137 0.660 0.515 0.840 0.173
Relative loss (%) 37.1 40.7
Static 1.146 1.030 1.116 1.116 1.058 1.058 0.513
Commitment 0.727 0.604 1.270 0.793 1.146 0.658 0.520 0.843 0.175
Relative loss (%) 36.5 41.4
Static 1.186 1.038 1.148 1.148 1.074 1.074 0.517
Commitment 0.760 0.602 1.314 0.829 1.156 0.656 0.525 0.845 0.177
Relative loss (%) 35.9 42.0
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